# 1AC

same

# 2AC

## China

### 2AC China K

#### The threat is real:

#### Modernization — they’re massively expanding military capabilities — that’s Kazianis and RTT

#### Bellicosity — RTT says they’re increasingly assertive in territorial disputes

#### Internal documents prove — none of their epistemology args apply — Kazianis and Yoshihara cite official PLA doctrine — anti-access attacks are a crucial part of their strategy and it’s a key objective to expand to Taiwan and the South China Sea

#### China’s expansion to South China Sea is rooted in historical national identity — the alternative is naiive

**Prabhakar 11** Dr.W.Lawrence S., Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Madras Christian College, Chennai, India; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Centre for Asian Strategic Studies, New Delhi, India; Guest Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology-Madras., “ The Evolving Geopolitics in the South China Sea”, PDF

Sovereignty Concerns and the apprehension of sovereignty violations by contending states both regional and extra-regional is a dominant factor in the region. Sovereignty concerns are derivative of the historical and colonial factors that have shaped the national identities and resistance to external domination. Territorial and maritime disputes and contentions over unresolved border and boundary issues have been emerged as vital points of assertion of national sovereignty. Regional responses to territorial disputes have been in the form of modernization of naval forces and air forces that are viewed as viable instruments to secure the islands and protect the maritime areas **The South China Sea is yet another source of national identity for China.** The “recovery” of the area for the Chinese leaders provides a means to erase a century of national humiliation of colonialism and “unjust treaties” that China was subjected to. **China views the issue as a part of the domestic issue** and hence the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas was passed by the National People’s Assembly as a means to recover the area to Chinese suzerainty. China reiterated claims in the South China Sea and stipulated the right to use force to protect islands-- the Spratlys and their surrounding waters. The law questioned the peaceful management of the territorial dispute and was regarded by the Association as a political provocation. **The PLA tends to view the South China Sea as a domestic issue-- a derivative of China’s national identity.** Superimposed on the patterns of power rivalry from the ancient period that had witnessed several power transitions between China, Japan, Korea and India, thus **the South China Sea** and the East China Sea **have been flash points that have intermittently triggered in different periods of history**. With the Cold war overlay since 1945-1991, the region was relatively calm thanks to the large measure of the strategic balancing of the United States and the Soviet Union—although the Cold war had witnessed the worst Indo-China conflict that raged for several years. In the post-cold war period and into the midway of the Globalization period, the South China Sea had emerged as vital hub for contending maritime access between China and most of the Southeast Asian states of Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, Thailand, Cambodia with most of the contentions over Spratlys and Paracels archipelago besides the other islands with contenders like the Woody Island (China) Layang Layang (Malaysia), Truong Sa Lon(Vietnam), Taipingdao (Taiwan), Pagasa (Rancudo) Airfield) (Philippines). These islands offer mid-sea access that could serve for amphibious and aerial staging points in a sea of contending territorial and resources disputes.

### 2AC — Mutual Threat Con

**Mutual threat construction is an institutional reality — we should engage it**

**Gries 7** (Peter Hayes, Harold J. & Ruth Newman Chair in U.S.-China Issues and Director of the Institute for U.S.- China Issues at the University of Oklahoma, “Harmony, Hegemony & U.S.-China Relations”, *World Literature Today*, July 2007 issue)

Furthermore, the new Chinese Occidentalism depicts Americans as an aggressive, militaristic, and threatening people. It certainly does not help that the current Bush administration’s embrace of military and unilateral means to resolve international disputes in Iraq and elsewhere has provided ample fodder for Chinese nationalist arguments. The danger is that heightened Chinese perceptions of U.S. threat could promote the emergence of an acute “security dilemma” in U.S.-China relations. Feeling threatened by a “hegemonic” U.S., Chinese could decide to step up their military modernization for defensive reasons. Americans would likely respond to increased Chinese arms acquisitions with heightened threat perception of their own, leading the U.S. to embrace its own defensive arms buildup. The unintended result: a possible U.S.-China arms race in East Asia. Absent feelings of mutual trust, and given the deep animosities that have led to the recent deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations and the always volatile situation in the Taiwan Strait, **there is a real possibility that the U**nited **S**tates **will get drawn into** yet another **conflict with China** in the first decades of the twenty-first century.¶ What can be done? While American and Chinese nationalists produce Orientalist and Occidentalist discourses based on similar epistemologies of difference, other Americans and Chinese can construct discourses of similarity. At its best, American and Chinese cultural products, like the special section on contemporary Chinese literature in this issue of World Literature Today, celebrate our common humanity. Translation and cultural exchange can reveal our shared challenges: modernization, globalization—indeed, the human condition. In the end, cultural products that raise awareness of our common humanity can serve as a vital counterweight to the discourses of difference and threat that undermine U.S.-China relations.

### 2AC — Paternalism

**The alt links — presumption China only “acts out” to “mirror us” is paternalist**

**Gries 7**

(Peter Hayes, Harold J. & Ruth Newman Chair in U.S.-China Issues and Director of the Institute for U.S.- China Issues at the University of Oklahoma, “Harmony, Hegemony & U.S.-China Relations”, *World Literature Today*, July 2007 issue)

Conversely, Chinese nationalists’ anger at Westerners who deny “China’s rise” represents the flip side of this same discourse of U.S.-China similarity. For instance, in 1999 the late Gerald Segal relegated China to “middling power” status in a high-profile Foreign Affairs article. He promptly drew the ire of the Beijing Review’s most prominent nationalist, Li Haibo, who retorted that “Chinese feel insulted when their strength is underestimated.”4 Similarly, Gordon Chang’s The Coming Collapse of China was the subject of Chinese nationalist ire upon its publication two years later in 2001.¶ Given that reassuring China’s neighbors about the peaceful nature of “China’s rise” is at the heart of Chinese foreign policy today—“peaceful rise” was even officially changed to “peaceful development” to avoid appearing militarily threatening—Chinese nationalist anger at Western “China is not a threat” arguments is actually counterproductive to China’s national interest, revealing the multiple and contradictory motives that drive Chinese nationalism today.

**2AC AT: SFP**

#### Your K is a unicorn — self-fulfilling prophecy is wrong and they cause extinction

**Blumenthal et al 11** ( Dan Blumenthal is a current commissioner and former vice chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, where he directs efforts to monitor, investigate, and provide recommendations on the national security implications of the economic relationship between the two countries. “Avoiding Armageddon with China” <http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/09/06/avoiding_armageddon_with_china?wpisrc=obinsite>)

The balancing and hedging strategy should involve options to avoid what Traub rightfully describes as "Armageddon." We call for a myriad of conventional options short of striking the nuclear-armed PRC, in the hope that such a strategy enhances deterrence in the first place and avoids Armageddon should deterrence fail. The strategy aims to slow escalation rather than quicken it. The idea of a self-fulfilling prophecy -- of turning China into an enemy by treating it as one **-- is like a unicorn**; it is a make believe creature that still has its believers. The United States has done more than any other country to "turn China into a friend" by welcoming it into the international community. Alas**, China has not fulfilled this U.S. "prophesy of friendship**." Instead China has built what all credible observers call a destabilizing military that has changed the status quo by holding a gun to Taiwan's head even as Taiwan makes bold attempts at peace, by claiming ever more territory in the South China Sea, and by attempting to bully and intimidate Japan. Traub asks whether our allies and partners will be willing to participate in an "anti-Chinese coalition," as he describes it. As the paper says, all allies, partners, and potential partners are already modernizing their militaries in response to China. And they will continue to do so regardless of whether the U.S. pursues what Traub would see as an "anti-China" strategy. Even laid-back Australia has plans to double its submarine fleet -- it is not doing so to defend against Fiji. The paper argues that it is time for the United States to offer more serious assistance so that matters do not get out of hand. A strong U.S. presence and commitment to the region's security can help avoid a regional **nuclear arms race**, for example. The United States can be a force multiplier by providing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance that only Washington possesses, and by training, and equipping our allies and friends. This strategy is one way of beginning to put Asia back in balance as China changes the status quo. Not doing so, we fear, **would lead to Armageddon**.

**No self-fulfilling prophecy**

**Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs - 1**

Aaron L. Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Commentary, Vol. 111, No. 2, February 2001, p. <https://lists.lsit.ucsb.edu/archives/gordon-newspost/2001-May/001274.html>

Is it possible, finally, that merely by talking and perhaps even by thinking about a full-blown Sino-American rivalry we may increase the probability of its actually coming to pass? This is the clear implication of Michael Swaine ’s letter. Mr. Swaine worries that “ordinary observers,” unable to distinguish between descriptions of present reality and “hair-raising scenarios” of the future, will conclude that “an intense geostrategic rivalry is virtually inevitable, and . . . respond accordingly.” While I am flattered by the thought that my article could somehow change the course of history, I very much doubt that it, or a hundred more like it, will have any such effect. On the other hand, I am disturbed by the suggestion that we ought to avoid discussing unpleasant possibilities for fear that someone (presumably our political representatives and “ordinary” fellow citizens) might get the wrong idea. Acknowledging real dangers is a necessary first step to avoiding them, as well as to preparing to cope with them if they should nevertheless come to pass. Refusing or neglecting to do so, it seems to me, is a far more likely formula for disaster.

## Colonialism

### 2AC FW

**The role of the ballot is to decide between a plan or a competitive policy option**

**It creates relevant strategies for change that are predictable and allow the aff to get offense against**

**The alternative isn’t a relevant consideration to whether the plan’s action should occur — voting issue, only opportunity costs should be evaluated to teach cost-benefit analysis**

**Our discussion raises awareness of cyber militarism and spills over to policy**

**NRC 9**, WILLIAM A. OWENS, AEA Holdings, Inc., Co-chair KENNETH W. DAM, University of Chicago, Co-chair THOMAS A. BERSON, Anagram Laboratories GERHARD CASPER, Stanford University DAVID D. CLARK, Massachusetts Institute of Technology RICHARD L. GARWIN, IBM Fellow Emeritus JACK L. GOLDSMITH III, Harvard Law School CARL G. O’BERRY, The Boeing Company JEROME H. SALTZER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (retired) MARK SEIDEN, MSB Associates SARAH SEWALL, Harvard University WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, Caplin & Drysdale WILLIAM O. STUDEMAN, U.S. Navy (retired) MICHAEL A. VATIS, Steptoe & Johnson LLP Staff HERBERT S. LIN, Study Director KRISTEN BATCH, Associate Staff Officer (through August 2008) TED SCHMITT, Consultant JANICE SABUDA, Senior Project Assistant (through March 2008) ERIC WHITAKER, Senior Project Assistant JOSEPH F. TRAUB, Columbia University, Chair PRITHVIRAJ BANERJEE, Hewlett Packard Company FREDERICK R. CHANG, University of Texas, Austin WILLIAM DALLY, Stanford University MARK E. DEAN, IBM Almaden Research Center DEBORAH L. ESTRIN, University of California, Los Angeles KEVIN C. KAHN, Intel Corporation JAMES KAJIYA, Microsoft Corporation RANDY H. KATZ, University of California, Berkeley JOHN E. KELLY III, IBM Research SARA KIESLER, Carnegie Mellon University JON KLEINBERG, Cornell University PETER LEE, Carnegie Mellon University TERESA H. MENG, Stanford University WILLIAM H. PRESS, University of Texas, Austin PRABHAKAR RAGHAVAN, Yahoo! Research DAVID E. SHAW, D.E. Shaw Research ALFRED Z. SPECTOR, Google, Inc. ROBERT F. SPROULL, Sun Microsystems, Inc. PETER SZOLOVITS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ANDREW J. VITERBI, Viterbi Group, LLC PETER WEINBERGER, Google, Inc. JON EISENBERG, Director RENEE HAWKINS, Financial and Administrative Manager HERBERT S. LIN, Chief Scientist, CSTB LYNETTE I. MILLETT, Senior Program Officer NANCY GILLIS, Program Officer

ENITAA. WILLIAMS, Associate Program Officer MORGAN R. MOTTO, Program Associate SHENAE BRADLEY, Senior Program Assistant ERIC WHITAKER, Senior Program Assistant, Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES, <http://www.anagram.com/berson/nrcoiw.pdf>

A historical analogy might be drawn to the study of nuclear issues. In many ways, today’s state of affairs regarding public discourse on cyberattack is analogous to the nuclear debate of 50 years ago. At that time, nuclear policy issues were veiled in secrecy, and there was little public debate about them. Herman Kahn’s books (On Thermonuclear War, Thinking the Unthinkable) were the first that addressed in the open literature what it might mean to fight a nuclear war. These seminal pieces did much to raise the public profile of these issues and stimulated an enormous amount of subsequent work outside government that has had a **real impact on nuclear policy**. From our perspective as the co-chairs of this study, the topic of cyberattack is so important across a multitude of national interests—not just defense or even just national security—that it **deserves robust and open discussion and debate**, both among thoughtful professionals in the policy, military, intelligence, law enforcement, and legal fields and among security practitioners in the private sector. But for such discussion and debate to be productive, they must be based on some **common foundation of information about the topic at hand.** Thus, **the report’s role in providing education and background is in our view its most important function**.

**Engaging policy is key**

**McClean**, **Professor – Philosophy, Rutgers**, **1**

**(THE CULTURAL LEFT AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL HOPE, http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm)**

Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the **grimy pragmatic details** where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and **it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about** but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

### Case Outweighs

#### Case outweighs –

**1) Miscalc – other countries perceive US cyber ops as a pretext to nuclear strike, so preemptively launch their weapons. Forced to retaliate causes escalating war**

**2) Centralization of control - example of praetorian power that breaks down nuclear agreements and causes escalatory measures**

**More likely than their impacts**

**1) misperceptions because so new**

**2) disproportional response because no norms**

**3) timeframe = instantaneous decisions**

**Alt can’t s – doesn’t stop cyber ops**

### AT: Epistemology

#### Their epistemology K is flawed – social constructions are knowable – they pre-exist individuals and constrain action in predictable ways – prefer the specificity of the aff to broad philosophical indictments

Fluck, PhD in International Politics from Aberystwyth, ’10 (Matthew, November, “Truth, Values and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Vol 39 No 2, SagePub)

Critical Realists arrive at their understanding of truth by inverting the post-positivist attitude; rather than asking what knowledge is like and structuring their account of the world accordingly, they assume that knowledge is possible and ask what the world must be like for that to be the case. 36 This position has its roots in the realist philosophy of science, where it is argued that scientists must assume that the theoretical entities they describe – atoms, gravity, bacteria and so on – are real, that they exist independently of thoughts or discourse. 37 Whereas positivists identify causal laws with recurrent phenomena, realists believe they are real tendencies and mechanisms. They argue that the only plausible explanation for the remarkable success of science is that theories refer to these real entities and mechanisms which exist independently of human experience. 38 Against this background, the Critical Realist philosopher Roy Bhaskar has argued that truth must have a dual aspect. On the one hand, it must refer to epistemic conditions and activities such as ‘reporting judgements’ and ‘assigning values’. On the other hand, it has an inescapably ontic aspect which involves ‘designating the states of affairs expressed and in virtue of which judgements are assigned the value “true’’’. In many respects the epistemic aspect must dominate; we can only identify truth through certain epistemic procedures and from within certain social contexts. Nevertheless, these procedures are oriented towards independent reality. The status of the conclusions they lead us to is not dependent on epistemic factors alone, but also on independently existing states of affairs. For this reason, Bhaskar argues that truth has a ‘genuinely ontological’ use. 39 Post-positivists would, of course, reply that whilst such an understanding of truth might be unproblematic in the natural sciences, in the social sciences the knower is part of the object known. This being the case, there cannot be an ontic aspect to the truths identified. Critical Realists accept that in social science there is interaction between subject and object; social structures involve the actions and ideas of social actors. 40 They add, however, that it does not follow that the structures in question are the creations of social scientists or that they are simply constituted through the ideas shared within society at a given moment. 41 According to Bhaskar, since we are born into a world of structures which precede us, we can ascribe independent existence to social structures on the basis of their pre-existence. We can recognise that they are real on the basis of their causal power – they have a constraining effect on our activity. 42 Critical Realists are happy to agree to an ‘epistemological relativism’ according to which knowledge is a social product created from a pre-existing set of beliefs, 43 but they maintain that the reality of social structures means that our beliefs about them can be more or less accurate – we must distinguish between the way things appear to us and the way they really are. There are procedures which enable us to rationally choose between accounts of reality and thereby arrive at more accurate understandings; epistemological relativism does not preclude judgemental rationalism. 44 It therefore remains possible to pursue the truth about social reality.

#### Don’t reject 1AC scholarship – the context ideas are produced in does not affect validity

Halliday, Professor – IR – London School of Economics, 93

(Orientalism and its Critics, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20 (2) p. 159-16)

A third difficulty with Said's approach is the methodological assumption it makes about the relation between the genesis of ideas and their validity, namely that because ideas are produced in a context of domination, or directly in the service of domination, they are thereby presumed to be invalid. Analogous ideas are to be found in much contemporary debate about ethnocentric and Eurocentric ideas, in the social sciences or elsewhere. Since Said's book was written, this theme has acquired much greater diffusion through cultural nationalism, post-modernism and so on. In the Middle East it can be found in the writings of Islamic writers, such as Khomeini, ever calling on people to be 'alert' biddr, against this corruption, and in the writings of many na- tionalist intellectuals, be this the later Anouar Abdel-Malek in Egypt or Jalal Al-e Ahmad in Iran, with his concept of westoxification or gharbzadegf. This is, to say the least, a rather contestable assertion, if taken in the context not of the Middle East in particular, or of nationalist assertion, but in its proper academic context-namely, the sociology of knowledge. If I have my disagreements with the epistemological assumptions underlying the approach of Lewis and his fellow writers on 'Islam', I am equally at odds with the epistemological assumptions of Said and the post-modernists. One can do worse than look again at the discussion of this matter by Karl Mannheim in his Ideology and Utopia:37 there are many difficulties with Mannheim's work, not least his view of the free-floating intellectual, but his discussion of the relation between genesis and validity is very pertinent here. As he points out, removing some of the polemic from Marx's discussion of ideology, the fact that a particular discovery or idea was produced by a particular interest group, or context-bound individual, tells us nothing about its validity. Medicine, aeronautics, or good food may be produced in such contexts of time, place, culture: they are not therefore to be rejected. The same, with appropriate variations, can apply to social science. Of course, the majority of social science ideas in the world today come from Western Europe and the US and were produced in the context of imperialism and capitalism: it would be odd if this were not so. But this tells us little about their validity. The terms 'Eurocentric' and 'ethnocentric', far too easily bandied about today, confuse a statement on historical origin with a covert assessment that needs justification in its own terms. And in one very important sense Eurocentrism is a valid starting point: the economic, social and political system that prevails in the world to-day, with all its varia- tions, including those of the Far East, is a European product and was spread through the combination of economic, military and political pressure known as imperialism. As Karl Marx and Bill Warren alike would have pointed out, Europe has created a world after its own image, like it or not. The implications of this issue of origin for the debate on Orientalism should be clear. The first is that in much of the critique of Western writing on the Middle East the assumption is made that because ideas are produced by exploiters this knowledge is therefore invalid. But elementary reflection would suggest that, apart from any possible independence or autonomy of the investigator, the very fact of trying to subjugate a country would to some degree involve producing an accurate picture of it. If you want to dominate a country, you need to know where its mines and oases are, to have a good map, to be aware of its ethnic and linguistic composition and so forth. The experts who came with Napoleon to Egypt in 1798 were part of an imperial project, but the knowledge they produced, whatever its motives, financing, use, had objective value. The same can be said, pari passu, with much later writing on the region. To put it bluntly: if you plan to rob a bank, you would be well advised to have a pretty accurate map of its layout, know what the routines and administrative practices of its employees are, and, preferably, have some idea of who you can suborn from within the organization.

### AT: Discourse First

#### Discourse can’t break down institutions

Tuathail, Professor of Geography at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 96 (Gearoid, Political Geography, Vol 15 No 6-7, p. 664, Science Direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

### Link Debate

#### Plan is a decrease in colonialist power

**1) alliances**

**2) decreases US power**

**Plan prevents worst forms of militarism –**

**The alternative to cyber ops is to put boots on the ground, kills more civilians and extends colonialism more**

**Taylor ev lists a ton of alt causes – things the alt doesn’t solve and overwhelm link**

**1NC didn’t read a link – even though the plan has the USFG perform an action, it is not based on a preference of the US, it’s a global view that opens up coalitions and alliances**

**Alternative cannot do the mandate of the plan text**

**Infinitely regressive**

**Lose all offense**

**Reason perm s**

### Perm

**Permutation do the plan and delink from Western epistemology**

#### Wholesale rejection of securitization fails – adopting an issue-specific consequentialist evaluation prevents their impacts without allowing millions to die for the sake of moral purity.

Rita Floyd, University of Warwick, **200**7 Review of International Studies, Vol 33 p 327-250)

Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security Considering the two brief overviews of the different schools provided in the first section, it could be argued that Wæver has an overly negative conception of security, whereas Booth and Wyn Jones have an overly positive conception of security. This article will aim to show that what form security takes is entirely issue-dependent, leaving both camps having something important and valid to contribute to the study of security as both camps can potentially be right. Issue-dependent hereby does not mean that, for example, all securitisations in one particular sector are always positive (negative) – indeed this article will show how differently securitisations in the environmental sector can turn out – it rather means that every incidence of securitisation is unique. Since this is the case, however, security in general is neither as good nor as bad as the two camps argue, but rather it is a mixed bag. In the approach proposed here, principles that determine whether a securitisation is positive or negative can only be derived by considering what would have been the alternative solution. Given that for the Copenhagen School, securitisation is nothing but ‘an extreme version of politicisation’,45 the question to consider in evaluating the nature of securitisation must be: did the securitisation in question achieve more, and/or better results than a mere politicisation of the issue would have done? It is important to note here, that ‘more and better’, is not equivalent to the success of the speech act (successful securitisation can still be negative), but rather it refers to whether the consequences of, and the gains from, the securitisation are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicisation. The idea that the moral rightness (or wrongness) of a securitisation depends on its consequences corresponds to what in moral philosophy is known as a consequentialist ethics. Consequentialism46 referring to a set of moral philosophies, which hold ‘that the rightness of an action is to be judged solely by consequences, states of affairs brought about by the action’.47 Or, put slightly differently ‘a consequentialist theory [. . .] is an account of what justifies an option over alternatives – the fact that it promotes values.’48 These premises capture well what is meant by positive and negative securitisation in this article, for the adjectives positive and negative do not refer to the relative success of the speech act that is securitisation, but rather to how well any given security policy addresses the insecurity in question. The approach introduced in this article will henceforth be referred to as a consequentialist evaluation of security. In moral philosophy the idea that the moral rightness (or wrongness) of an action is attributable to its consequences alone is of course contentious (see also fn. 46). The question that arises is thus, why, in the evaluation of security/ securitisation, focus on consequences as opposed to, for example, rights as deontologists would have it, or indeed virtues, as virtue theorists suggest? Much of the answer to this question already lies in the argument of this article. Thus it is not only this author’s opinion that the key to security evaluation lies with its consequences, rather scholars from both the schools discussed above, with their respective positive and negative views of security, themselves already focus on what they take to be the consequences of security. That is to say these scholars themselves are consequentialists. However, and as this article aims to show, the consequentialism proposed by them is neither very balanced nor, in the long run, particularly helpful, as in both cases, consequentialism is constricted by the nature of their respective theoretical frameworks. Frameworks, whereby one promotes security as emancipation, therefore generating a necessarily positive view of security, whilst the other school’s framework for analysis is void of emancipation altogether, therefore partial to a negative view of security. That security is neither always positive nor negative but rather issue dependent is the key hypothesis of this article. If this hypothesis holds true we are – as a discipline – much in need of a more balanced and indeed critical evaluation of security than proposed by either school, a provision of which is the purpose of this article. Given what has been said so far it should have become clear that the herewith proposed consequentialist evaluation of security is also the key to rendering the above-mentioned ‘normative dilemma of speaking and writing security’ less important, as it enables the analyst to critically evaluate his/her speaking and writing security, rather than his/her simply speaking and writing security. This approach thus enables the previously solely analytical securitisation analyst to step into the security equation and on behalf of the actors encourage some securitisations and renounce others, depending on the moral rightness of the respective securitisation’s consequences. It is precisely at this point where the emancipatory nature of the Welsh School’s security studies becomes crucially relevant for a consequentialist evaluation of security, for – under this approach – it is the task of the analyst to fight ignorance (or, put differently, false consciousness) on the part of existing and/or potential securitising actors and inform (or better enlighten) them of the best possible actions. But how does the analyst know what the best possible actions are? Or, put differently, with what standards in mind are the consequences to be evaluated? Is it enough to problematise securitisation by elites for elites, and make majority consensus the measuring unit behind the principles for positive/negative securitisation? One should think not. Although it is useful to assume, that the narrower the interest group behind the securitisation, the more likely it is to be negative, this cannot be ascertained as the only general principle. After all, majority consensus does not prevent the effective securitisation of something that is morally/ethically wrong. But how to determine what is morally/ethically right? In security studies, one way of doing so, is by entering the evaluation of positive/negative through the discourses of security prevalent in the different sectors of security. Here, by working out the specific security relations in the competing discourses that make up the individual sector – who or what is the referent object of security, who is the securitising actor and what is the nature of the threat – it should be possible to determine the most and the least advantageous strategies in addressing insecurity; thereby determining which approach to security (in the individual sector) is the best (most positive) all-round – morally, ethically, effective – strategy. A consequentialist evaluation of security thus postulates the maximisation of genuine security as its overarching value. The invocation of values itself is perfectly legitimate, particularly considering that ‘every moral theory invokes values such that it can make sense to recommend in consequentialist fashion that they be promoted or in non-consequentialist fashion that they be honoured,

#### The permutation solves best – their K overdetermines the religious foundations of exceptionalism, political missions like US non-proliferation can be progressive and should be separated out from more conservative versions

Ceaser 12

(James, Harry F. Byrd Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia, “The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism”, *American Political Thought*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2012), pp. 3-28)

Contrary to what the dominant view holds, the idea of a mission in America has not been a single doctrine. It has had (and still has) a variant that is primarily religious, focused on the role of faith community in the divine plan, and a variant that is primarily political, focused on the fate of republican government in the world. The political mission, which is of primary interest here, has been justified on very different grounds: sometimes by religious ideas but more often by ideas from philosophy, science, or political analysis. Furthermore, in the instances when religious and nonreligious ideas about the mission have been commingled, the nonreligious ideas have often been the driving force. Finally, the religious ideas that have influenced the political mission have not always been orthodox or “fundamentalist.” More often than not, they follow strands of what is known as “liberal theology,” which seeks to bring religion into line with existing philosophic or scientific doctrines.¶ What is at stake in this debate apart from the accuracy of historical interpretation? As discussed, the historical interpretation of the dominant view has spilled over into current policy debates. Antiexceptionalists have embraced the dominant view, finding that they can put it to use to discredit the idea of the mission. One effect of the alternative position to be developed here would be to free contemporary policy thinking from the conceptual straightjacket of conceiving of the mission as having only one form. By viewing the American political tradition as offering a number of different models of a mission, it might be possible to conceive of the mission in a fairer, and less ideological, light. Certain formulations of the mission may have been, and may be, dangerous; others may have been, and may be, helpful, supplying the nation with energy, collective commitment, and purpose.

### Perm NB

#### China and NK are net benefits to the perm –

**1) external example of why the plan is necessary – sometimes state matters because []**

**2) link turns – key to prevent china from colonizing Taiwan, inevitable absent the aff**

### AT: Imperialism

#### Economics and past interventions limit US imperialism

Ben Ami, VP of Toledo International Centre for Peace, ’11 (Shlomo, July 1, “Arab Spring, Western Fall” Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/benami55/English)

The old vocation of what Rudyard Kipling called the “White Man’s Burden” – the driving idea behind the West’s quest for global hegemony from the days of imperial expansion in the nineteenth century to the current, pathetically inconclusive, Libyan intervention – has clearly run out of steam. Politically and economically exhausted, and attentive to electorates clamoring for a shift of priorities to urgent domestic concerns, Europe and America are no longer very capable of imposing their values and interests through costly military interventions in faraway lands. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was stating the obvious when he recently lambasted NATO’s European members for their lukewarm response to the alliance’s missions, and for their poor military capabilities. (Ten weeks into the fighting in Libya, the Europeans were already running out of munitions.) He warned that if Europe’s attitude to NATO did not change, the Alliance would degenerate into “collective military irrelevance.” Europe’s reluctance to participate in military endeavors should not come as a revelation. The Old Continent has been immersed since World War II in a “post-historical” discourse that rules out the use of force as a way to resolve conflicts, let alone to bring about regime change. And now it is engaged in a fateful struggle to secure the very existence and viability of the European Union. As a result, Europe is retreating into a narrow regional outlook – and assuming that America will carry the burden of major global issues. But America itself is reconsidering its priorities. These are trying economic times for the US, largely owing to imperial overstretch financed by Chinese credit. Admiral Mike Mullen, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently defined America’s colossal fiscal deficits as the biggest threat to its national security. Indeed, at a time of painful budget cuts – the US is facing a $52 trillion shortfall on public pensions and health care in the coming decades – the US can no longer be expected to maintain its current level of global military engagement. But the fiscal crisis is not the whole story. The dire lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will shape future debate about America’s international role in the twenty-first century. At an address in February to cadets at the US Military Academy at West Point, Gates said that “any future defense secretary who advises the president to send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.” Gates’s recent statements are by no means those of a lonely isolationist in an otherwise interventionist America. He expressed a widely perceived imperative for strategic reassessment. In 1947, in a landmark article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” which he signed as “X,” George Kennan defined America’s foreign-policy strategy for the Cold War as one of containment and deterrence. It is difficult to imagine a more marked departure from Kennan’s concepts than a report recently released by the Pentagon – A National Strategic Narrative – authored by two active-duty military officers who signed as “Y.” The report can be dismissed as just the musings of two senior members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff writing in their “personal capacity.” But its real power stems from the degree to which it reflects America’s mood in an era of declining global influence and diminishing expectations regarding the relevance of military power to sustaining US global hegemony. Just as Kennan’s “X” article was fully reflective of the mood in America at the time, so the Narrative expresses the current American Zeitgeist. Thus, the idea that “Y” might turn out to be a latter-day “X” – defining the nature of America’s international role in the twenty-first century – may not be far-fetched. Conspicuously, there is much in the Narrative that coincides with Europe’s emphasis on soft power. The authors call for a shift from outdated Cold War strategies of “power and control” to one of civic engagement and sustainable prosperity. Security, they maintain, means more than defense. It means engagement whereby America should not seek “to bully, intimidate, cajole, or persuade others to accept our unique values or to share our national objectives.” America, “Y” argues, must first put its own house in order if it is to recover credible global influence as a beacon of prosperity and justice. This would require improving America’s diplomatic capabilities, as well as regaining international competitiveness through greater investment in education and infrastructure at home. The message emanating now from the US is not one of non-interventionism, but a strategy of restraint that assumes that there are limits to American power and seeks to minimize the risk of entanglement in foreign conflicts. As Gates put it in his West Point address, the US Army would no longer be “a Victorian nation-building constabulary designed to chase guerrillas, build schools, or sip tea.”

### AT: Root Cause

#### No single cause of conflict – be suspicious of their “master variable”, authors exaggerate problems their programs have the best chance of solving

Barnett et al 7

Michael, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O’Donnell, Laura Sitea, Global Governance, “Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?”, Questia

Because there are multiple contributing causes of conflict, almost any international assistance effort that addresses any perceived or real grievance can arguably be called "peacebuilding." Moreover, anyone invited to imagine the causes of violent conflict might generate a rather expansive laundry list of issues to be addressed in the postconflict period, including income distribution, land reform, democracy and the rule of law, human security, corruption, gender equality, refugee reintegration, economic development, ethnonational divisions, environmental degradation, transitional justice, and on and on. There are at least two good reasons for such a fertile imagination. One, there is no master variable for explaining either the outbreak of violence or the construction of a positive peace but merely groupings of factors across categories such as greed and grievance, and catalytic events. Variables that might be relatively harmless in some contexts can be a potent cocktail in others. Conversely, we have relatively little knowledge regarding what causes peace or what the paths to peace are. Although democratic states that have reasonably high per capita incomes are at a reduced risk of conflict, being democratic and rich is no guarantor of a positive peace, and illiberal and poor countries, at times, also have had their share of success. Second, organizations are likely to claim that their core competencies and mandates are critical to peacebuilding. They might be right. They also might be opportunistic. After all, if peacebuilding is big business, then there are good bureaucratic reasons for claiming that they are an invaluable partner.

### Alt = Bad (Spivak)

#### the alternative’s utopian rejection places the negative in a superior position of purity – we must recognize we are complicit with structures of power and work within them to oppose colonialism

Kapoor, 2008 (Ilan, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, “The Postcolonial Politics of Development,” p. 54-55)

Taking Derrida’s lead, Spivak insists that deconstruction and critique are only made possible by what is already there, by what inevitably surrounds and inhabits you. ‘The only things one really deconstructs are things in which one is intimately mired. It speaks you. You speak it’ (1990a: 135). You can never represent or act from an ‘outside’, since you are always already situated inside discourse, culture, institutions, geopolitics. Spivak thus describes her deconstructive approach as the persistent critique of ‘a structure that one cannot not (wish to) inhabit’ (1993: 60). Not surprisingly, she warns against the total repudiation of one’s ‘home’, arguing, as we have already noted, that it amounts to a disavowal of one’s complicities and results in claims of purity, transparency, or triumphalism. Instead, she advocates negotiation from within. The point is to take seriously that with which one is familiar, to acknowledge that one is seduced by it, even as one engages in a persistent critique of it. In a sense, Spivak is cautioning the likes of postdevelopment critics such as Escobar against throwing the baby out with the bathwater by being uncompromis- ingly ‘anti-development’ and arguing for ‘alternatives to development’ (Escobar 1995: 215). If development were that dominant and oppressive, then how could the critic claim to be outside it (this is unacknowledged complicity) or represent the subaltern and social movement as pure and untangled (which amounts to essentialization and romanticization) or indeed posit a utopic alternative (i.e. from where would such an alternative arise if not from the bowels of development itself? and how could it miraculously escape from creating its own disciplining/power structures?)? Hence Spivak motions: ‘let us become vigilant about our own practice and use it as much as we can rather than make the totally counter-productive gesture of repudiating it’ (1990a: 11). It is possible to work within the belly of the beast and still engage in persistent critique of hegemonic representations. Development may indeed be a shady business, but this does not mean one cannot retrieve from within it an ethico-political orientation to the Third World and the subaltern. Thus, for instance, the World Bank and IMF may well be ‘imperialistic’ organizations, but they are too important and powerful to turn our backs on; instead, we can engage them unrelentingly from all sides to try to make them accountable to the subaltern. ‘Unlearning one’s privilege as loss’ A concomitant step is the ‘careful project of un-learning our privilege as our loss’ (Spivak 1990a: 9; cf. 1988a: 287). In a sense, for Spivak, one cannot do ‘field- work’ without first doing one’s ‘homework’. The itinerary toward representing the Other ‘over there’, requires scrutiny of the ‘here’ (Visweswaran 1994: 112). Or it necessitates reversing the gaze, re-imagining what we mean by the ‘field’ or the ‘there’. Thus, Spivak characterizes her teaching in the West (at Columbia University) as fieldwork, in a deliberate attempt to anthropologize the West (1993: 278; 1997: 5; 2003a: 620). What this means, in effect, is casting a keen eye on the familiar and the taken-for-granted. It is not enough to try and efface oneself, to benevolently try and step down from one’s position of authority; in fact, as Spivak has reminded us, this gesture is often a reinforcement of privilege, not a disavowal of it (cf. Alcoff 1991: 25). Rather, the idea is to retrace the history and itinerary of one’s prejudices and learned habits (from racism, sexism, and classism to academic elitism and ethnocentrism), stop thinking of oneself as better or fitter, and unlearn dominant systems of knowledge and representation. This is what Spivak calls a ‘transformation of consciousness — a changing mind set’ (1990a: 20), and what others have variously penned as ‘decolonization’ (Fanon), ‘conscientization’ (Freire), and ‘accountable positioning’ (Haraway).

#### C. Purity – postcolonialism’s total negativity makes deciding between greater and lesser evils impossible – makes producing a better world impossible

Kapoor, 2008 (Ilan, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, “The Postcolonial Politics of Development,” p. 57-58)

But while I disagree with the criticisms of Spivak on these points, I believe there are other points on which her thinking appears incomplete, if not unclear. Her hyper-self-reflexivity may not be paralyzing; however, it tends to be inade- quately layered, in my view. That is, it does not distinguish between varying degrees of complicity. Now Spivak may respond that this type of objection is really an exculpatory attempt, aimed once again at self-validation (‘I am not as guilty as X, so therefore I am better than X’). It can be. But it can also be important, as Chapter 1 emphasized, for the purposes of strategizing and prioritizing. For example, an advocacy group may need to distinguish between complicities to assess if these NGO activities are more benign than tho

se World Bank ones, and hence decide where efforts and resources are better spent for organizing against them. Unfortunately, Spivak provides no way of making such assessments. Her deconstructivist approach may have an unmistakable ethico-political horizon, but it lacks any adjudicative mechanism for sorting among and between greater goods and lesser evils. Moreover, Spivak is adamant about taking account of institutional positioning in representation; yet, she appears to neglect the institutional implications of the ethical encounter with the subaltern. She points, ultimately, to the necessity of a one-to-one relationship for it to be intimate, caring, and non-exploitative. Reflecting on her own recent work training primary school teachers and spending quality time with ‘tribal’ (adivasi) children in Bangladesh and India, she refers to such a relationship as striving towards ‘“answer”ability’ and ‘ethical singularity’ (1999: 384; cf. 1996: 276; 1997: 5; 2003a: 622-3). Her reasons for prescribing a face-to-face encounter are important, but the institutional consequences are unclear and perhaps untenable. How does a personalized and micrological approach translate into institutional or macrological politics? Given the scale and depth of global and local inequalities, how practicable is a one-to-one approach on a large scale? Is an intimate relationship with the subaltern even compatible with institutional processes, let alone on a large scale? Unfortunately, Spivak leaves these types of questions unanswered. Yet, not attending to issues of do-ability gives her work a romantic, utopic dimension. It endows her discussion of the ethical encounter with the subaltern with a quasi-mystical, ecstatic character that is at odds with her otherwise Marxist-deconstructivist leanings.